Diplomatic Settlement Projects of the “Afghan Issue” (1980–1981)

Abstract

The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted for over nine years, from December 1979 to February 1989. The Afghan conflict became the largest military campaign of the Cold War. The continuing war in Afghanistan actually began to threaten peace and stability not only in Central Asia but in the whole world. It became a dead end for the occupiers, too. The international community perceived Soviet aggression as a significant threat to international peace and security. In the early 1980s the search for a diplomatic settlement to the situation around Afghanistan began. The purpose of the article is to investigate the ways of diplomatic settlement of the “Afghan issue” in 1980—1981 (before the Geneva Peace Talks) on the basis of official documents of the United Nations and the US National Security Archive. At the core of the research methodology there are typological, comparative аnd problem-chronological methods. In 1980–1981 a number of countries and international organizations initiated projects for a diplomatic settlement of the Afghan conflict. These countries were the following: the United States, Great Britain, France, Pakistan and others. The United Kingdom proposed a two-stage international conference to discuss the ending of foreign interference in Afghanistan and withdrawing foreign troops. According to the plan proposed by Pakistan, Soviet troops were to leave the DRA and be replaced by “international peacekeepers”. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (the President of France) proposed to convene an international conference with the participation of countries suspected of interfering in the internal affairs of the DRA in order to develop commitments on non-interference and refusal to supply weapons to Afghanistan. These projects were rejected by the USSR and the DRA. They argued that the official government of Afghanistan had not been invited to the proposed international conferences. The world community did not recognize the official government of Afghanistan. The authority of the USSR in the international arena fell significantly. Thus, the main reason for the delay in the negotiation process was the Soviet leadership’s adherence to the force line of conduct in relation to Afghanistan and the transfer of all responsibility for the Afghan crisis to its ideological opponents in the Cold War.